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Issue-Choice, Messaging, and
Organizing: A Sociological Approach to
Three Ballot Measures in Colorado in
2006
Guillaume Marche
1 The 2008 and 2010 elections are an index of profound political  change in the United
States. In the wake of these historical presidential and mid-term elections, it is important
to keep sight of previous election cycles, and 2006 was significant on more than one count
—not only at the federal level, but also at that of the states. In particular, 2006 was an
important stage in the decade-long trend toward the development of ballot measures.
One of the states which contributed to the upward trend is Colorado, where voters were
consulted on fourteen measures in the 2006 and 2008 ballots, up from six in 2004 and ten
in 2002. This state thus appears as an interesting laboratory for studying the significance
of ballot initiatives and referendums. The focus of this article is not to debate the pros
and cons of the process itself, whether or not they are a reliable way of getting policy
enacted or of making up for the shortcomings of representative democracy.1 We mean
rather  to  approach  the  issue  through  a  sociological  lens,  in  order  to  assess  the
significance of this form of participatory democracy for social movements by examining
the involvement of civil society in ballot-measure campaigns. As placing issues on the
ballot has  proved  rather  efficient  for  the  conservative  Right  to  push  its  agenda  in
American politics, one may indeed wonder whether progressive social movements are
also able to use popular plebiscites to their own advantage. Or on the contrary, are they
somehow at the mercy of whatever conservative measures get put on the ballot? More
generally, the question is whether progressive social movement organizations manage to
use ballot campaigns to advance their own goals, or whether they have to defensively
tailor  their  action—hence  to  some  extent  their  agenda—to  the  conservative  ballot
onslaught.
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2 Colorado is an interesting case to study these issues, due to the presence on the 2006
ballot  of  two progressive  measures  with antagonistic  fates:  an initiative  to  raise  the
state’s minimum wage, which passed by 53 percent of the vote, and a referendum for the
creation of domestic partnerships, which was defeated by the same margin,2 while an
initiative to ban same-sex marriage was approved by 56 percent. Such a situation may
seem contradictory, or at least paradoxical. That is why the context and reasons for such
a contrasted outcome require close scrutiny. These two examples are also instructive for
sociological  investigation  of  social  movements,  as  they  challenge  the  researcher  to
determine whether the success of a ballot-measure campaign is premised upon issue-
choice,  messaging,  or  organizing.  This  contribution  neither  purports  to  assess  the
significance of ballot initiatives in terms of local—versus federal or national—democracy,
nor  attempts  to  situate  the  2006  ballot  initiative  campaign in  Colorado in  the  more
general political context of the United States, as political scientists do. Rather it takes a
microscopic, narrow-angle look at the 2006 campaign on these two issues, in order to
gauge  what  it  implied  for  the  progressive  social  movement  organizations  which
participated in it. This article is thus based on qualitative fieldwork conducted in Denver
in March and April 2008, during which we had 22 interviews with 24 progressive social
movement  leaders,  organizers  and  participants  who  contributed  to  the  2006  ballot-
measure  campaign.3 These  non-directive  interviews  offer  enlightening  insights  into
participants’ experience of the 2006 campaign and hence into the strategic challenges
posed by  ballot  measures.  Confronting  this  first-hand material  with  political  science
literature on ballot measures and sociological social-movement theory thus provides an
opportunity to tackle a seldom-studied aspect of ballot measures.
 
Initiative and referendum in Colorado: the 2006 ballot
3 Putting an initiative on the ballot in Colorado is a relatively easy process, as this state has
one  of  the  lowest  qualification  thresholds.  According  to  the  state  Constitution,
“signatures by registered electors in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total
number of votes cast for all candidates for the office of Secretary of State at the previous
general election shall be required to propose any measure by petition” (Colorado State
Constitution V, 1:2). In other words, for citizens to put an initiative on the 2006 ballot
they merely  needed to  collect  68,000 voter  signatures  (currently  76,000).  Among the
eighteen states which authorize both initiative and referendum Colorado is one of the
four—along with Massachusetts, Missouri, and North Dakota—in which qualifying for the
ballot is easiest (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2006). This is partly due to the fact
that  the  standard by  which the  threshold  is  defined—a proportion of  votes  cast  for
electing the Secretary of State—is attached to a candidate election which usually draws
the least participation (Hazouri: interview; Colorado Secretary of State, 2002, 100-04). As a
result  Colorado  has  the  fourth  highest  rate  of  successful  constitutional  amendment
initiatives—the only three states with higher rates being Florida, Oregon, and California
(Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2006).
4 Measures  can  also  be  submitted  to  the  people’s  approval  by  the  Colorado  General
Assembly (state Congress): submitting a change in an existing statute (law) to referendum
requires a simple majority in both houses,4 whereas constitutional amendments require a
two-thirds majority. The difference between initiatives and referendums is essentially
that  the former are  meant  to  create  new law,  whereas  the latter  may only  concern
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already existing law.5 Furthermore, whether statutory or constitutional, a referendum
can also be mandated by popular petition with the same number of signatures as for an
initiative—“five percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for the office
of the Secretary of State at the previous general election” (Colorado State Constitution V,
1:3).  In  effect,  most  constitutional  amendments  in  Colorado  are  approved  through
popular initiative, whereas most state assembly-initiated referendums concern statutory
measures.
5 Amendment 42, the measure to raise the state’s minimum wage, was put on the 2006
ballot as an initiative in a concerted effort by a liberal coalition of four organizations: the
Association of  Community  Organizations  for  Reform  Now  (ACORN),  the  American
Federation  of  Labor-Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations  (AFL-CIO),  the  Colorado
Progressive Coalition (CPC), and 9to5 National Organization of Working Women (9to5).
Colorado was one of six states—along with Arizona, Montana, Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio
—where indexing the state’s minimum wage to inflation was victoriously placed on the
ballot that year (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2006). In Colorado the measure was
not statutory, but an amendment to write the minimum wage raise and indexing into
Article XVIII of the constitution, a particularly bold—and divisive—strategy.6 There was
indeed heated debate among the supporters of a minimum wage increase not only as to
how much it should be raised from the $5.15 federal rate—to $6.85 an hour, more, or less
—, but also as to whether making it a constitutional amendment was a wise choice.
6 The anti-gay marriage ballot initiative, Amendment 43, which originated with Focus on
the Family,  a  national  conservative religious  group based in Colorado Springs,  has  a
somewhat  more  complex  history.  It  was  launched  in  the  wake  of  the  2004  general
election, when a record number of eleven states passed constitutional gay marriage bans.7
In 2006 such measures appeared on ballots in eight additional states, including Colorado.8
Focus on the Family had originally targeted a broad exclusion, barring same-sex couples
from other types of official recognition, such as domestic partnerships or civil unions, as
well  as  marriage—as  in  nine  of  the  eleven  states  which  passed  anti-gay  marriage
amendments two years earlier. Opponents of the measure had referred to this as the
“dirty version” of the proposed amendment—the “clean version” narrowing the ban to
marriage only,  as supported for example by the Catholic Church. That was when gay
rights advocates decided to launch an initiative for a constitutional amendment to create
domestic partnerships. This initiative, filed as Amendment 45,9 was conceived so as to
“goad the opponents [of gay rights] into filing the ‘dirty version’—because there would be
people in their constituency that would be so upset that we were advancing the idea of
partnerships, that they would want to bring the more extreme version to the ballot,” says
Pat Steadman, a political consultant with Mendez and Steadman who was one of the
campaign’s main drivers (interview). The “dirty version” in other words seemed easier to
defeat in the polls than the “clean version”. Also in the plan, in the likely event that the
gay-marriage  ban  was  passed,  should  voters  approve  both  its  “dirty  version”  and
Amendment 45, the result would be a constitutional impasse to be solved by the judiciary.
This would thus provide an opportunity to have the gay-marriage constitutional  ban
struck down by the state’s Supreme Court, which would not only amount to defeating the
local attack on gay rights, but even to striking a victory in the national battle for the
recognition  of  same-sex  couples  (Steadman:  interview).  The  anti-gay  marriage
amendment  however  was  ultimately  qualified  in  its  “clean  version”,  known  as
Amendment 43.10 As a consequence the Amendment 45 initiative was withdrawn by its
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promoters,  who  instead  called  upon  the  Colorado  General  Assembly  to  submit  a
referendum measure legalizing domestic partnerships, which eventually became known
as Referendum I (Zeller 2006).11
7 Colorado voters in 2006 were thus faced with both Referendum I and Amendment 43, the
“clean version” of the gay-marriage ban. As Colorado in 2006 was one of the many states
where the legislature had already passed a statutory ban on same-sex marriage,12 adding
an identical  constitutional ban would serve little actual purpose in denying same-sex
couples the right to marry, save making the ban more difficult to overturn either in the
polls,  or  by  the  state’s  Supreme Court  (D.  Smith,  DeSantis  and Kassel,  2006,  80).13 A
constitutional amendment in other words actually added little to the existing statutory
definition of  marriage as  the union of  one man and one woman:  there is  thus little
question that its promoters intended Amendment 43 as a “wedge issue” aimed at dividing
up the Democratic Party’s voting base (Shaw: interview).14 On the contrary, Referendum I
originated as a defensive tactic to oppose a severe attack on the recognition of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, rather than as a deliberate plan to enforce
liberal  policy.  It  was  crafted  as  an  experiment:  countering  an  anti-gay  marriage
amendment with an alternative “yes” campaign, a more effective plebiscitary device than
the unsuccessful  “no” campaigns  which had been led in  all  other  states  where  gay-
marriage bans had been proposed (Brewer: interview).
8 Progressive movements are generally less prone to putting measures on the ballot than
their conservative opponents,  who have successfully exploited this political  tactic for
years.  Part of  why the Colorado 2006 case is  highly interesting,  is  indeed due to the
coexistence  of  two successful  ballot  initiatives—one put  out  by  the  progressive  Left,
minimum wage,  another by the conservative Right,  gay marriage—and one defensive
referendum which failed to impair the latter. Since our focus here is not the motives of
conservative movements in devising ballot measures, but the impact of such measures
upon progressive social movements, we based our study on fieldwork conducted in March
and April  2008 in Denver,  where we approached organizations,  leaders,  and activists
involved in the 2006 campaigns in favor of the minimum-wage raise (Amendment 42) and
of domestic partnerships (Referendum I), and against the gay-marriage ban (Amendment
43). It is worth noting that there was not much of a campaign against Amendment 43,
since promoting Referendum I was the main strategy used to undercut the ban on same-
sex  unions.15 We  had  interviews  with  people  who  collected  petition  signatures  and
registered voters,16 went door-to-door canvassing or phone-banking, sent letters and e-
mails, created events to attract media visibility, participated in press-conferences and
debates, created and distributed voting guides,17 or coordinated any such efforts.
 
Ballot measures and the significance of issue-choice
9 In  assessing  the  political  significance  of  ballot  initiatives  political  scientists  usually
address the so-called “spill-over effect” whereby voters’ decisions on ballot propositions
spill  over  onto  their  choice  in  the  simultaneous  candidate  elections  (Schauffler  and
Morgan, 1996; Makin, 2006). Some scholars have thus evinced ballot measures’ impact in
increasing turnout at the polls (Tolbert, Grummel and D. Smith, 2001), highlighting the
fact that their effect on voter participation is stronger in mid-term elections, which have
relatively low-key national media exposure (M. Smith, 2001). This is pertinent for our
study of the 2006 ballot, a national mid-term election, but with particularly high stakes
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for turn-out in Colorado since it coincided with a gubernatorial election. Other scholars
focus on ballot measures’ “priming effect”—namely their capacity to boost the support of
voters who are most susceptible to go to the polls for the candidates whom they perceive
to be in sync with their views on the issue at hand (D. Smith, DeSantis and Kassel, 2006).
These  scholars  approach ballot  measures  as  a  get-out-the-vote  tool,  not  so  much in
quantitative terms—increasing  overall  participation—as  in  qualitative terms—polarizing
partisan alignments and securing the votes of a party’s core constituency.
10 This would seem to be the case of Amendment 42, as its placement on the ballot was
influenced by opinion poll results showing it was likely to function as an incentive for
liberal voters (Hanna: interview), and it is reported to have been “part of a coordinated
campaign  to  increase  support  for  Democratic  candidates  and  possibly  influence  the
balance of power in the U.S.  House and Senate” (Initiative and Referendum Institute,
2007,  1).  Observations  of  Amendment  42  suggest  that  in  such  direct  democracy
campaigns, the issues on the ballot matter less than the underlying tactical aim they are
meant to serve—i.e. to introduce sharp political divisions. Daniel Klawitter, who is now a
religious outreach organizer with the Front Range Economic Strategy Center (FRESC),18
was involved in the 2006 Amendment  42 campaign as  a  union representative  in the
health-care division of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). In candidate
elections,  he  reports,  you  usually  campaign  for  “the  lesser  of  two  evils,”  but  the
minimum-wage campaign issue “was so clear” (interview). Indeed, whereas the legislative
process is based upon bargaining and compromise through the successive readings of a
bill  within  legislative  bodies  (Jones:  interview),  with  ballot  measures  “you  can’t
compromise, you can’t really discuss, it’s an all-or-nothing measure. You either vote it all
up, or vote it all down,” says Michael Huttner, executive director of ProgressNow.org
(interview).19 Amendment 42 may thus be interpreted as an attempt to raise a wedge issue
in order to boost the liberal vote, with a significant degree of success since 2006 marks a
historic victory for Colorado’s Democratic Party, which confirmed its majority in both
houses of the General Assembly and replaced Republican Governor Bill  Owens with a
Democrat,  Bill  Ritter,  the  first  time  since  1958  that  the  Democratic  Party  held  the
governorship and a majority in both state legislative houses (Gathright and Hartman,
2006).
11 Referendum I  (pro-domestic  partnership)  differs  from Amendment  42  (pro-minimum
wage) in this  respect,  insofar as Amendment 43 was aimed at  bringing out same-sex
marriage  as  a  wedge  issue,  whereas  Referendum  I  was  a  tactical  firewall  against
Amendment 43. That is why its promoters played down the partisan divide and instead
insisted that “having a domestic partnership is an issue that can affect anyone regardless
of whether they are a Democrat, or a Republican,” in the words of Ru Johnson, African
American outreach coordinator with Coloradans for Fairness and Equality (CFFE),  the
umbrella organization which steered the Referendum I campaign (interview). Of course,
ballot campaigns do tend to highlight ideological fault lines, so that voters will take an
unambiguous stance on the issues, and although CFFE refused to see Referendum I in
partisan terms, it had to make voters get a clear-cut sense of what it identified the stakes
to be: “basic legal rights”. The campaign however took care to not situate that fault line
with regards  to  partisan politics:  CFFE’s  executive director  Sean Duffy  is  notoriously
Republican—he  used  to  be  a  close  advisor  to  former  Governor  Bill  Owens—and  the
campaign in fact aimed at bridging the partisan divide. Its target audience was the middle
of the political spectrum: “There was this very fine line; in American politics we have this
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moveable middle,” says Denise Whinnen, one of the leading strategists in CFFE who is
now deputy director of community relations at the Gay and Lesbian Fund for Colorado
(GLFC).20 “And it was that middle that we needed to talk to and convince that this was a
just and fair argument” (interview). In essence, by claiming that domestic partnership is
not marriage but a matter of basic legal rights, the Referendum I campaign endeavored to
short-circuit the wedge-issue strategy of Amendment 43’s promoters.
12 Furthermore,  although  Amendment  43  was  successful  insofar  as  it  passed,  the  2006
election in Colorado resulted more generally in severe defeat for the Republican Party.
This suggests that ballot measures function politically in paradoxical ways: on the one
hand, the overall result implies that significant numbers of Democratic voters said “yes”
to Amendment 43 and “no” to domestic partnerships; but on the other hand, one cannot
discount the importance of Republicans’  voting the opposite way on these two ballot
measures. This means that the Republican vote, no less than the Democratic vote, should
never be regarded as  monolithic.  As elsewhere in the West,  Republicans in Colorado
adhere  to  a  strong  libertarian  streak,  and  though  the  state  is  home  to  what  Bill
Vandenberg, executive director of the Colorado Progressive Coalition (CPC),21 calls “the
Vatican of  the evangelical  Right”—namely Colorado Springs,  home to James Dobson’s
Focus  on the  Family  and several  other  evangelical  institutions—it  is  also  one  of  the
nation’s least religiously observant states, he notes: “Western states have a reputation of
conservatism, but a lot of it is privacy and keep your laws off my body” (interview). For
example, Colorado, which in 1893 was among the first states to grant women full suffrage,
is certainly not one of the states with the harshest restrictions on women’s access to
abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2010). The notion that same-sex unions are an effective
wedge issue for getting out the conservative vote therefore must be subject to caution:
this  is  seen  in  Colorado  in  2006  as  in  the  2004  presidential  election  for  example
(Ansolabehere and Stewart, 2005; Egan and Sherrill, 2006, 6; Hillygus and Shields, 2005;
Langer and Cohen, 2005).
13 The three ballot measures under scrutiny in our study would therefore lead to mutually
contradictory conclusions if studied from the angle of their get-out-the-vote potential.
What  this  discrepancy  suggests  is  that  analyzing  ballot  measures  mainly  as  voter
mobilization tools fails to reveal their deeper political import.
14 The other main angle from which political scientists approach ballot measures is voter
education. Quantitative political science literature documents a positive impact of ballot
measure on voters’ engagement and knowledge (Tolbert, McNeal and D. Smith, 2003; M.
Smith,  2002).  “When elections  permit  people  to  make  choices  on  substantive  issues,
politics might seem more relevant to their lives, and their interest in it could be piqued,”
writes Mark Smith (2002, 894). One way of wondering whether ballot measures foster
voter education is to examine whether they provide the public with enough information
to incite them to vote. The 2006 Colorado case holds mitigated lessons on this count. For
example,  Cathryn  Hazouri,  executive  director  of  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union
(ACLU) of Colorado, which endorsed both Amendment 42 and Referendum I, and officially
opposed Amendment 43, explains that the internal language used by the ACLU differed
from its public language. For example, although the ACLU of Colorado has a poverty and
economic justice policy—unlike the national ACLU, which is not involved in economic
issues—there was some internal debate about whether the organization should endorse
Amendment  42,  and the  winning argument  was  one  which reconciled economic  and
cultural issues: “People who are constantly concerned about making decisions about food
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and clothes, or food and transportation don’t have the stamina, usually, to enforce their
civil liberties and civil rights, and it’s only fair that they should have the same ability to
do that as anyone else;” likewise, “if a gay person can’t decide to love whomever he or she
wants,  the  fact  that  they  may  make  a  hundred  dollars  an  hour  doesn’t  make  any
difference, because they will have to behave in a furtive manner, they will have to hide
and lie, and that can’t be a very pleasant life” (interview). In other words, cultural rights
and  economic  justice  are  inseparable.  However,  she  confesses,  “I’m  very  pragmatic:
winning the ballot was more important than educating voters, because of the immediate
effect it would have on these populations. So I try to link the issues to the general public
later” (interview). Thus, in order to avoid upsetting potential supporters of increasing the
minimum  wage  by  bringing  up  fairness  to  LGBT  people,  or  the  reverse,  the  ACLU
abstained from educating voters on what is an important element of its conception of
civil liberties and fundamental rights. In this case, consequently, the short-term goal of
winning  the  ballot  tends  to  outweigh  that  of  deepening  and  broadening  voters’
understanding of the very issues about which they are consulted.
15 But ballot measures also raise some more fundamental issues as regards voter education.
They may actually be rather deceptive, as the 2008 campaign in Colorado illustrates. The
movement led by Ward Connerly was promoting an anti-affirmative action initiative to be
placed  on  the  ballot  in  2008,  which  was  entitled  “Colorado  Civil  Rights  Initiative”;
petition-gatherers were able to collect signatures from supporters of racial and ethnic
fairness—who do support affirmative action—for an initiative actually meant to do away
with it (Vandenberg: interview; Frosch, 2008).22 But aside from sometimes disorienting
voters about the issues, ballot measures can spread erroneous ideas about institutional
processes.  Like  many other  activists,  for  instance,  Hazouri  is  wary of  initiatives  and
referendums which amend the constitution. “Having the constitution amended so easily
isn’t good government,” she claims. That is why she not only deplores a history of voters
being confused, or actually deceived, on the issues themselves, but she also believes that
the signature threshold should be higher for constitutional initiatives than for statutory
ones, that the number of signatures required should be broken down by district so as to
make sure that initiatives reflect a statewide desire to change the constitution, and that a
qualified  majority  in  the  polls  should  be  necessary  for  changing  the  constitution
(interview).23 However,  as a result  of  the state’s  lax amending process,  writes Dennis
Polhill,  “[p]robably  about  one-quarter  of  Colorado’s  42  initiated  constitutional
amendments  could  have  been  statutes  instead”  (2006,  6).  What  this  means  is  that,
although the  plebiscitary  process  can  be  educative  in  itself,  as  voters  become more
informed about certain issues and more engaged in the outcome of voting, it has several
drawbacks: one is to narrowly define and thus oversimplify complex issues, another is to
create confusion about political institutions.
16 This  explains  why  active  participants  in  ballot  campaigns  sometimes  consider
constitutional amendment measures to be a double-edged sword. From a strategic point
of view, Rich Jones, director of policy and research at The Bell Policy Center,24 recalls that
the  proposal  to  write  the  minimum-wage  increase  into  the  constitution  cost  the
campaign  the  endorsements  of  almost  all  Colorado  newspapers’  editorial  boards
(interview).  This,  he  thinks,  accounts  for  Amendment  42’s  relatively  narrow  margin
compared to opinion polls prior to the ballot (Jones, 2006). Katie Groke, then public affairs
coordinator at Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains, is wary of amending the
constitution  for  a  somewhat  more  fundamental  reason:  since  constitutional
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jurisprudence is the basis of women’s access to abortion in the United States, activists in
the pro-choice movement, she thinks, ought to address any constitutional change with
caution (interview).25 In-depth voter education would require setting constitutional law
in  context.  Instead,  acknowledges  Terri  McMaster,  director  of  Lutheran  Advocacy
Ministry  (LAM)  of  Colorado,26 even  though  her  organization  justified  writing  the
minimum-wage increase in the constitution by saying “it’s close enough to a human right
that it belongs in the constitution,” the real motivation was one of political expediency:
“we don’t trust our politicians not to undo it in some time, so we put it in the constitution
to make it permanent” (interview).
17 These  shortcomings  of  ballot  measures  in  educating  voters  explain  why  several
campaigners we interviewed favor seeking change through the legislative process rather
than through direct democracy.27 Katie Groke thus notes that, although he is known for
not being pro-choice, Governor Ritter in 2007 signed into law a bill legalizing access to
emergency contraception for victims of sexual assault.28 Pat Steadman likewise refers to
the successful  passage of  a  change in the state’s  employment non-discrimination act
(ENDA)  adding  sexual  orientation  and  gender  expression  to  the  list  of  protected
categories,29 as an illustration that the state legislature is a safer venue for promoting
LGBT rights than appealing to the voters. The same year, the legislature also passed a bill
making second-parent adoption available to same-sex couples—that is to say allowing the
same-sex partner of a biological parent to adopt.30 “I’ve kind of had it with the idea of
counting on the electorate to do the right thing, because they’re too easily swayed by
wedge politics, emotional issues, and fear, and misinformation,” Steadman says. Issues of
economic inequality, or environmental problems, he adds, “are harder to distort: people
have a more fixed concept of what it is—a minimum wage, or open-space conservation—
than something with which they’re not as familiar. Marriage, they thought they were
familiar  with,  and  they  would  vote  for  that”  (interview).  Steadman  here  draws  a
distinction between issues voters do know about and issues they think they know about,
which throws into doubt  the very notion of  voter education.  Political  scientist  Mark
Smith’s analysis at once coincides with, and helps qualify, Steadman’s skepticism, as he
points to the difference between voters’  “knowledge” of issues,  and their “ability” to
make informed decisions about them (2002,  896).  Without disowning the quantitative
data indicating that  ballot  measures  do contribute to  increasing political  knowledge,
Smith indeed calls for evaluations of the process to pay attention to such qualitative
factors as “whether initiatives undermine minority rights” and “whether voters make
informed decisions on initiatives” in particular (2002, 901).
18 Furthermore,  the  prevalence  of  homophobia  among the general  public,  for  example,
suggests that there is a bias against putting cultural rights before the electorate. But at
the same time,  the example of  minimum wage implies that  there may be deterrents
against promoting economic issues before the legislature, where the restaurant industry
enjoys  much  stronger  support  than  among  the  Colorado  population  at  large  (Jones:
interview).31 In addition to these structural problems, Steadman’s remark also suggests
that cultural issues are particularly dependent on the short-term context. Referendum I’s
defeat is thus often partly ascribed to its coincidence with the New Jersey Lewis v. Harris
ruling on October 25, 2006. Two years after the introduction of domestic partnerships, the
Supreme  Court  of  that  state  ruled  that  it  was  unconstitutional  under  the  state
constitution’s  equal  protection  clause  to  deny  same-sex  couples  the  rights  afforded
married couples (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2006).32 Thus, just two weeks before the
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2006 ballot, this development gave credibility to the claim by Referendum I’s opponents
that saying domestic partnership is not marriage was a sham, and that the measure was in
effect  intended  as  the  first  step  toward  legalizing  same-sex  marriage  (De  Cambra:
interview; Kim, 2006b). Referendum I’s chances of approval were also hampered by the
Ted Haggard scandal,  which erupted five  days  before the  November 7,  2006 ballot.33
Ironically, Michael Jones—the male escort who had got paid for sexual intercourse by
Haggard and decided to expose him—did so in the belief that he would thus discredit his
client  and,  in  turn,  the  anti-gay  marriage  initiative  he  actively  supported (Quintero,
2006).  He  contributed  instead  to  what  Bobby  Clark,  deputy  director of
ProgressNowAction,34 calls  the  “ick”  factor  which  played  out  against  the  domestic-
partnership referendum: “The Ted Haggard story reminded people that gay people have
sex and that that isn’t a good thing” (interview). Hypotheses about the impact of last-
minute  context  changes  seem  to  be  confirmed  by  the  sudden  drop  in  support  for
Referendum I which was measured by opinion polls within the week prior to Election Day
(Zeller, 2006; Frank, 2006; Kim, 2006a).
19 Mobilizing around ballot measures therefore raises important inner conflicts for social
movements.  Ballot  measures’  significance  of  course  cannot  be  subsumed  to  their
immediate purpose. Aside from the short-term objective of winning victories on specific
issues, one of the apparent potential benefits of participating in such campaigns is to
educate  the  citizenry  on  social  movements’  long-term  goals.  However,  given  the
questions assailing the effectiveness of voter education in ballot campaigns,  one may
wonder whether they do not instead trap progressive social-movement organizations
into  campaigning  that  diverts  their  resources  from  their  original  mission.  Social
movements’ aim indeed goes beyond making strategic gains on a given issue or set of
issues, or on behalf of a given group of people: they may be defined as forms of collective
action mobilized by conflict and geared toward redefining the terms of a society’s social
contract (Touraine, 1988; Melucci, 1996). Educating the citizenry then is an integral part
of what they are about.  This is true of minority-based social  movements fighting for
recognition: recognition demands not only that marginalized groups be allowed at the
table,  but  also  that  the  terms  of  the  conversation be  altered  to  accommodate  them
(Taylor, 1994; Ferree et al., 2002). From this theoretical standpoint, minority-based social
movements are about challenging the boundaries of inclusion: this necessarily involves
redefining  social  norms  through  contentious,  democratic  deliberation,  and  hence
challenging power relations (Guidry and Sawyer, 2003; Mouffe, 1996). And this appears to
be just  as  true of  social  movements driven by economic inequality,  as  they call  into
question the  very  definition of  fairness  in  the  distribution of  material  resources,  by
submitting it to the same contentious deliberation.
20 As a democratic process which does not quite hold its promise of enhancing citizens’
ability to grasp the ins and outs of issues, ballot measures seem to put a premium on—in
Habermassian terms—“mass opinion” rather than “public opinion”, the former being “a
pathological  condition”  of  the  public  sphere  in  which  opinion  is  controlled  and
exchanged  asymmetrically  (Staats,  2004,  586).  Ballot  measures  may  in  this  sense  be
regarded as a diversion of social movements’ resources, since they put a lot of stress on
progressive organizations,  beyond the results  they may yield.  Taking once again the
internal ACLU debates as to whether to endorse Amendment 42, one recurrent issue, as
Cathryn Hazouri recalls, was whether the proposed raise—approximately 30 percent—was
sufficient or not: “What we really wanted was a real living wage—but the decision we had
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to make was: do we want to have half the loaf, or do we want to stay out of it because it’s
not the whole loaf?” (interview). Also considering the political quandary as to whether
incremental gains fundamentally undermine long-term strategic goals, Pat Steadman and
Jeff  Thormodsgaard, who both actively campaigned for Referendum I,  likewise report
that  several  LGBT  organizations  and  spokespeople—including  among  the  Colorado
Stonewall Democrats35—had mixed feelings about Referendum I because it was not full
marriage (interview).  In other words,  not  only do ballot  measures fall  short  of  what
Alberto Melucci calls the “symbolic challenge” of social movements (1985), but they also
apparently fail to deliver in terms of social movements’ instrumental goals.
 
Social-movement strategy: issue-choice and
messaging
21 These remarks point out the need to analytically distinguish between issue choice and
messaging,  for  seldom  do  the  strategic  short-term  goals  which  a  social  movement
embraces at any given time fully coincide with its overarching agenda. As Hazouri aptly
puts it, “half a loaf now isn’t bad, if you can get the other half later. You’re not selling out
—you’re just buying less at the moment” (interview). In other words, issue-choice—as
opposed  to  longer-term  strategic  considerations—is  perhaps  not  the  most  pertinent
criterion for assessing the significance of ballot measures for social movements.
22 What on the other hand are the lessons to be learned from the way in which political
messages were articulated in the 2006 ballot-measure campaign in Colorado? For a better
understanding of  social  movements,  a  striking difference is  to be noted between the
campaigns for Amendment 42 and for Referendum I: the former was personalized, in that
it crafted its message in such a way as to highlight its concrete implications for real-life
people,  whereas  the  latter  treated  it  as  a  more  abstract  matter  of  principle.  The
minimum-wage  campaign  was  focused  on  informing  the  public  about  the  personal
experience and difficulties of people living at minimum wage. Here is how Linda Meric,
national  executive director  of  9to5,  National  Association of  Working Women (9to5),36
describes one way her organization campaigned for Amendment 42:
Our members shared their stories with reporters about what it was like to try to
work at minimum wage and to support your family. We utilized that to do a few
things. One is to put a human face—this really is an issue that affects people—but also
to debunk a little  bit  the myths that are out there about who earns the minimum
wage: you know, some of the business groups will constantly say that minimum-
wage earners are just teenagers flipping hamburgers for their first job, and it’s not
the truth—the people who are working at minimum wage are 9to5 members who
are women trying to support children on these jobs, and having a very hard time
(interview, emphasis mine).
23 Noteworthy in this statement is the direct relationship it establishes between the stated
tactical device—“put a human face”—and the perceived truth of the matter—“debunk the
myths”.  Other  organizations  in  the  campaign  also  provided  the  media  with  real-life
stories  of  people  struggling  to  make  ends  meet  on  minimum  wage,  such  as  Jeffrey
Edwards, a member of ACORN who was featured in an in-depth Denver Post article one
week  before  the  ballot  (McGhee,  2006).37 His  story  was  included  in  “Seven  Days  at
Minimum Wage”, a video blog co-sponsored by ACORN and the AFL-CIO, and hosted by
Roseanne Barr, the actress playing the lead character in the soap opera Roseanne in the
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1990s, whose ongoing popularity helped publicize the individual stories in the video blog.
38
24 To better grasp the strategic significance of this personalized campaign, one may turn to
the sociological theory of collective action frames. Initiated in particular by sociologists
Robert  Benford  and  David  Snow,  framing  theory  approaches  participants  in  social
movements  “as  signifying agents  actively  engaged in the  production of  meaning for
constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford and Snow, 2000, 613).
Frames are the meanings, the narratives by which movement actors make sense of their
collective action (Benford and Snow, 1992, 137). They fall into three categories: diagnostic
(whereby actors interpret the causes of the situation they intend to change), prognostic
(which formulate the intended outcomes), and motivational (which provide actors with
significant reasons for mobilizing) (Benford and Snow, 2000, 617-18). The examples above
suggest that the minimum-wage campaign’s strategy displayed a high level of congruence
between the various frames within which it operated. It provided its audience with an
analysis of current social ills (diagnostic frame), an easily accessible way to redress them
(prognostic frame), and a good reason to identify and feel personally concerned with the
issue at hand (motivational frame), all of which were articulated in mutually consistent
terms.
25 The picture is strikingly different with the domestic-partnership campaign, due to the
political risks of being explicit about homosexuality. Says Denise Whinnen:
We tried to do things differently than what had been done in any other state, and
the message was that this was basic legal rights. So we actually went through the
statutes  and looked at  the  kinds  of  things  that  same-gender  partners  were  not
allowed  to  participate  in  legally,  and  we  made  cases  for  things  like  hospital
visitation, things that will happen around wills and probate, what will happen with
children. We really tried to take the inflammatory rhetoric and emotional pieces
out, and said “these are just basic legal rights, things that people should be able to
do together in a partnership.” (interview)
26 The point of this strategy was to deflect the opponents of LGBT rights’ most extreme
rhetoric  by  articulating  the  issue  in  language  that  was  meant  to  defuse  it.  The
justification was also that in order to pass,  Referendum I must be made palatable to
voting blocs which could not be taken for granted as favoring LGBT rights.  Maria De
Cambra, who was then outreach coordinator with the Latino community for Coloradans
for Fairness and Equality and is currently program director at Latina Initiative,39 found it
crucial to make domestic partnerships a “human issue” rather than a “gay issue”. The
point was to emphasize Latinos’ belief in human rights, in order to avoid the widespread
reluctance among Latinos to explicitly discuss homosexuality—a reluctance which all too
often generates the stereotype that “Latinos don’t like gays” (interview).
27 But more generally, Whinnen insists,
It was a deliberate strategy to try something different from what had been tried in
other states. What had been tried in other states clearly wasn’t working, because we
were losing every single ballot in the country, so making the emotional appeal did
not work, it was not enough to move people, so we were trying to find what people
need to hear to think about this in a different way (interview).
28 The  domestic-partnership  campaign  therefore  developed  a  universalizing frame:
establishing some degree of interpersonal identification between voters and the potential
beneficiaries of the measure was to be achieved by adapting the image of the latter to the
allegedly universal reference frame of the former, and certainly not by attempting to
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bring mainstream voters to understand the particularized experience of same-sex couples.
To put it plainly, the message was intentionally normalized. But the main point of making
a legal-rights argument was to frame the issue as an abstract one, and thus deflect the
dangers  of  discussing  the  potentially  disturbing  specifics  of  a  same-sex  couple’s
experience.  Therefore  what  people  needed  to  hear,  strategists  of  the  Referendum  I
campaign gauged, was indeed not about homosexuality. Every participant at every level in
the  campaign  was  thus  cautiously  instructed  that  “it’s  basic  legal  rights,  it’s  not
marriage,” points Jeff Thormodsgaard. He also recalls for example that, though gay and
an official spokesperson for the campaign, he was not expected to use his identity as a
discussion point when addressing audiences, for instance by referring to his own, real-life
experience (interview).
29 The universalizing legal-rights argument cast the issue in normative terms, since the
norm in democracy is for all individuals to enjoy equal rights. The legal-rights argument
was thus tantamount to claiming that this issue could and should be widely approved, on
a principled basis, at the polls. There wasindeed a strong rationale for this strategy, since
throughout the 2006 run-up it was realistic to expect Amendment 43 to be backed by a
majority of voters (Merritt, 2006). Domestic-partnership campaign organizers understood
that for many, perhaps most Colorado voters there was something almost obvious to
saying marriage is  between a man and a woman—“like saying the sky is  blue,” says
Michael Huttner (interview)—so Referendum I was intentionally framed in “conservative”
terms.  Thormodsgaard  goes  so  far  as  to  say  “it  was  a  campaign  geared  toward
Republicans, run by a Republican, a very conservatively oriented message—messaging
was very Republican” (interview).  The whole point  was indeed to target  people who
would vote “yes” on Amendment 43 anyway to vote “yes” on Referendum I as well.40
Michael Brewer, who is currently the executive director of the Brett Family Foundation,41
was then the legal director of the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Community
Center of Colorado (The Center) and a consultant with the Referendum I campaign in
charge of disseminating campaign material to the clergy statewide. He makes a case for
the mainstreaming, dehomosexualizing message which was chosen, by claiming it was a
simple matter of demographics and arithmetic: the LGBT community is very small, and
was not even unanimous about Referendum I—one minority will not settle for less than
marriage, another considers that marriage and civil unions have a class bias and ought
therefore not to be goals of the LGBT movement.  This further enhanced the need to
address a predominantly straight, presumably mainstream electorate if Referendum I was
to muster the support of more than fifty percent of voters (interview).
30 The universalizing frame resulted in one television ad featuring a man in a hospital
corridor, saying nothing but looking deeply anguished, with voice-over explaining how
couples deprived of official recognition may be separated in times of difficulty: “What if
the doors were shut simply because you were gay? No matter who you are, commitment
is commitment. Learn more about Referendum I.”42 Bobby Clark is at odds with the fact
that this and other pro-domestic partnership ads never showed actual same-sex couples:
“It was very difficult to make an issue [whose language] is about gay couples not about gay
couples,  so  it  had to  be  about  gay  couples”  (interview).  On  the  contrary,  one  anti-
Referendum I advertisement featured a gay couple visiting an attorney to make legal
arrangements securing their rights as a couple: the scenario is a conversation between
the three characters where the gay couple discuss their issues—hospital visitation, home-
owning,  funeral  arrangements—and  the  attorney  reassures  them,  until  a  voice-over
Issue-Choice, Messaging, and Organizing: A Sociological Approach to Three Bal...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2011
12
concludes: “Gay activists want you to believe domestic partnerships are about benefits,
but  they  already have  those  legal  rights.  Coloradans  are  fair,  but  we  don’t  want
counterfeit marriage. Vote ‘yes’ on Amendment 43 and ‘no’ on Referendum I.”43 The anti-
domestic partnership advertisement was thus paradoxically more embodied, less abstract
and removed from same-sex couples’ real-life concerns than the one in support.
31 Benford and Snow’s definition brings light to the significance of frames: “collective action
frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the
activities  and campaigns of  a  social  movement  organization,”  they write  (2000,  614).
Striking  in  this  statement  is  the  parallel  it  draws  between  objective  considerations
(“meanings”, “legitimate”), and subjective ones (“beliefs”, “inspire”). This suggests that
collective action frames may be all the more effective as the two converge, an insight
confirmed by the sociology of identity and subjectivity (Calhoun, 1994; Dubet, 1994). To
some extent the meanings in the motivational frame used by the Referendum I campaign
in order to legitimate a “yes” vote was at odds with the beliefs in the diagnostic and
prognostic frames which inspired the activists. Ru Johnson expresses this feeling when she
compares the Amendment 42 and Referendum I campaigns: 
Minimum wage? It’s simple: we want to raise the minimum wage. Why do we want
to raise the minimum wage? Because people are not making enough money—that’s
also something that can be seen as having a lot of passion in it, whereas domestic
partnership: that was seen from the beginning as a very legislative initiative.
32 Her discourse actually abounds with terms denoting enthusiasm when referring to the
former campaign, and terms denoting caution when referring to the latter (interview).
According to Johnson, whereas the minimum-wage campaign made for actors’ subjective
involvement in their message, the domestic-partnership campaign used a frame which
distanced, or alienated actors from their message. This suggests, to borrow another set of
concepts  from framing  theory,  that  the  set  of  meanings  used  by  the  Referendum I
campaign  specifically  in  order  to  carry  out  its  collective  action—its  “organizational
frame”—was at odds with some of its actors’ deeply held beliefs about the significance of
the  mobilization  to  which  they  were  contributing—the  campaign’s  “master  frame”
(Benford and Snow, 1992, 138; 2000, 619).
33 One may argue, however, that the rights-based strategy was not fundamentally flawed,
for Amendment 43—which the proposed creation of domestic partnerships was initially
meant  to  counter—passed,  but  not  by  a  landslide  and with  a  significantly  narrower
margin than in several other states.44 Moreover, Referendum I in fact came fairly close to
passing, since it failed by fewer than 40,000 votes (Colorado Secretary of State, 2006). The
outcome of the vote, moreover, was affected by a series of technical problems with voting
machines on Election Day, which prevented approximately 15 to 20,000 people in Denver
in particular—one of the state’s most liberal constituencies—from either voting, or having
their  ballots  counted (Brewer:  interview;  Merritt  and Human,  2006).  Additionally  the
creation of new voting locations, vote-centers, in application of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002, resulted in many disoriented voters not finding their polls, discouragingly
long  lines  in  some  places,  and  some  vote-centers  running  out  of  ballots  (Hazouri:
interview; Fair Vote Colorado, 2006; Pew Center on the States, 2006), which presumably
cost Referendum I additional votes of support.
34 On a more symbolical plane, Michael Brewer actually considers the mere fact that its
opponents could not afford to disregard Referendum I altogether, but had to actively
fight it in order to secure the passage of Amendment 43, as a victory in itself: “It bugged
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the hell out of them,” he comments. “I’m glad we did it,  I  think we could have done
better, I think we could have won, I really do, but I’m really glad we did it” (interview).45
The symbolical spin-off of a result in the polls can indeed be very important, as suggested
by Linda Meric, who claims that the degree of public discourse and awareness generated
by the Amendment 42 campaign has increased 9to5’s credibility with elected officials in
the legislature, for example: it became easier to generate legislative support for the three
bills  it  successfully  advocated  in  2008.46 Besides,  Jane  Feustel,  who  is  a  community
organizer at Colorado Progressive Action and actively participated in the Amendment 42
campaign,47 claims that victory in the polls  is  not always what matters the most,  by
pointing to the anti-gay marriage amendment in neighboring Arizona. Most observers
ascribe its 2006 defeat to its broad language: Arizona Proposition 107 specified that “no
legal status for unmarried persons shall be created or recognized by [the] state or its political
subdivisions that  is  similar  to  that  of  marriage” (emphasis  mine),  thereby making it
impossible  for  different-sex  couples  as  well  as  same-sex  couples  to  seek  official
recognition  other  than  marriage.48 Noting  that  the  anti-Proposition  107  campaign
emphasized how its passage would affect straight couples, because that was the angle
with the broadest appeal, Feustel concludes that they may have won in the polls, but they
lost politically by failing to address issues of equality for LGBT people (interview). Thus a
short-term electoral victory may, in the longer term, end up not serving LGBT rights.
35 Conversely this implies that, even though it lost in the polls, Referendum I could pay off
in  the  longer  run if  it  engaged voters  in  significant  political  conversations.  But  the
question is  whether a  public  debate on LGBT rights  actually  occurred.  Bobby Clark’s
assessment is that
for  most  Coloradans  the  campaign  existed  in  the  commercials  they  saw  on
television. You’d go to parties, nobody talked about it. It was as if it didn’t exist: it
existed in commercials, but there was no movement to it. […] It was not really that
the message was not a good message, it’s more that the idea of this never really
worked itself into the social—into the public dialogue. (interview)
36 This statement is but one of the clearest articulations of a broadly shared feeling among
our interviewees.
37 The subsequent  question which arises  is  therefore what  makes it  possible  to  engage
voters in significant conversations that would, if not guarantee victory in the polls, at
least  allow for  some in-depth voter-education.  Is  it  predicated on the  message?  Our
previous  remarks  and Clark’s  assessment  suggest  that  such is  not  the  case:  framing
Referendum I in terms of basic legal rights was in part meant to do, and could have done,
just that. As a matter of fact, the minimum-wage Amendment 42 campaign did not carry a
message of radical social  transformation, either,  but instead painted its opponents as
special-interest groups and appealed to a common-sense notion: “hard work deserves fair
pay” (Colorado Progressive Coalition 2006).49 So there was something rather mainstream
about its message too. And yet, one of the clear outcomes of our field research is that the
minimum-wage campaign did generate significant political debate. Our first conclusion
was that an instrumental analysis of ballot measures’ impact upon electoral politics does
not allow us to grasp the full political meaning of ballot measures; what our perspective
on campaign frames has just shown, furthermore, is that messaging, no more than issue-
choice, exhausts the matter of ballot measure’s sociological significance with regard to
social movements.
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Civic engagement and the political significance of
organizing
38 These remarks address the issue of how campaigns relate to audiences, which is not only
a matter of messaging, but also of organizing. Katie Groke cites people who would have
actually benefited from domestic partnerships but did not feel concerned enough to go to
the polls, concluding that no vote can be taken for granted. Extending the matter to the
anti-abortion ballot initiative which the pro-choice movement was facing in the 2008
ballot, she claims:
Just because people come and buy pills from us doesn’t mean they’re going to vote
on our issues: we have to earn their vote, we have to kiss their ass, basically, to
make it feel like it’s the end of the world for them—and we have to make it so
personal to their specific person that they get it: it’s like dating! Getting someone to
go to the polls is like getting someone to go on a date with you. (interview)
39 Beyond  its  humorous  bluntness  and  exaggeration,  the  statement  is  particularly
interesting  in  that  the  amorous  comparison  lays  the  emphasis  on  how  personal  a
commitment voting is, and the very term “earn” points to the effort involved. Likewise,
Jeff Thormodsgaard claims that the Referendum I campaign basically took the LGBT vote
for granted, therefore abstained from spending resources to mobilize its own base, and
hence alienated it: “The message also ostracized the community to a certain degree—
ostracized  the  community  from  really  jumping  on  board”  (interview).  These
considerations differ from the notion developed above about campaigners being alienated
from their own message. The point here is the status of the LGBT community as audience,
rather than protagonist of the campaign, though the two are interrelated.
40 Like other interviewees, Groke understands the rationale for reaching out to the moveable
middle of the electorate by providing it with a harmless interpretation of the domestic-
partnership ballot measure, but that, she claims, is “what you do after you motivate your
base.” Her argument is that the LGBT community was the campaign’s core constituency,
who “live next door to the mushy middle, or their sister is the mushy middle, or they
have friends in the mushy middle. So if you’re not educating them on the message, and
why it’s so important and they should get to the polls, they’re not talking to these people
who might not already be convinced” (interview). Interesting in this statement is that it
criticizes CFFE’s strategy in terms strikingly similar to those quoted above by Denise
Whinnen to justify it: it was all a matter of hitting the “mushy” or “moveable” middle.
But whereas Whinnen referred to messaging, Groke here tackles a question of organizing:
for her the LGBT community should have been the campaign’s primary audience so that
they may have become its most dedicated promoters. In terms of framing theory, the
campaign’s frame seems to have lacked resonance, which Benford and Snow define as “the
extent to which [a frame] resonates with the life world of adherents and constituents as
well  as  bystanders”  (1992,  140).  In  this  instance,  by  failing  to  identify  the  LGBT
community  as  its  constituency,  the  campaign  missed  an  opportunity  for  LGBT
protagonists to convey to the broader audience a frame endowed with narrative fidelity,
which is the degree to which “proffered framings […] resonate with their targets’ cultural
narratives” (2000, 622). As highlighted by Benford and Snow, frames are indeed not given,
but negotiated (2000, 614-18): they are at once the starting point and already the result of
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collective action. What is at stake here is therefore a matter of organizing in order to
mobilize.
41 By  comparison,  organizing  to  mobilize  core  audiences  is  what  the  Amendment  42
campaign paid a lot of attention to. Jane Feustel’s job for example was part of an effort
funded by Women’s Voices Women Vote50 to target single-women voters. Throughout the
2006 run-up she canvassed on behalf of the Colorado Progressive Coalition (CPC) in areas
that were not covered by other ballot-measure campaigns or by candidate campaigns,
such as Aurora, a lower-income Eastern suburb of Denver.51 Aurora was targeted as a
traditionally Republican constituency, based on analyses showing that this was due to
lack of voting on the part of lower-income people, rather than to actual across-the-board
conservative preferences (interview). Feustel thus clearly participated in a get-out-the-
vote effort; however bringing low-income voters to the polls was not just a matter of
winning a short-term victory, but of enfranchising a whole segment of the electorate. For
9to5, as well as CPC and ACORN, voter registration and education is part of the regular
agenda, so ballot measures in a sense serve as one more opportunity to register new
voters  and  educate  low-propensity  voters,  says  Linda  Meric.  In  2006,  9to5  thus
campaigned  for  Amendment  42  in  such  places  as  Commerce City,  a  low-income
community with typically infrequent or unregistered voters who are also among the
people most closely concerned with issues of minimum wage (Meric: interview).
42 Enfranchising unregistered or low-propensity voters demands substantial organizational
efforts.  Lindsey Hodel is  the coordinator of the 501(c)(3) Roundtable,52 which in 2006
directly addressed 30,000 registered low-propensity voters to inform them about voting
by mail, which significantly increased the likelihood that they would actually vote. These
voters received literature by mail, followed up by two phone-calls, a procedure which
usually yields an average response rate of 0.5 to 2 percent. This effort led 1,300 such
voters to register to vote by mail, a response rate of approximately 5 percent. The 501(c)
(3) Roundtable also endeavors to incite citizens to hold their elected officials accountable,
a long-term voter-education process requiring organizations to keep their constituencies
informed about issues between election cycles (interview). What this example shows is
not so much whether ballot measures imply get-out-the-vote tactics, for in a sense they
are  always  somehow  bound  to.  The  question  rather  is  how  social-movement
organizations get out the vote, and for what purpose.
43 From this point of  view,  issue-choice and messaging are but two tools for “inspiring
people” (Vandenberg: interview) to overcome their distaste of politics and politicians if
need be. For Ben Hanna, head organizer at Denver ACORN, one of the organizations which
initiated Amendment 42, “when you can tie something like that—something that’s going
to directly affect somebody—to voting, then it starts to take it out of the realm of like,
‘that is politics, and this is my life’” (interview). The challenge is therefore to reconcile
voters with voting, not by artificially enhancing partisan divides, but by bridging the gap
between the realm of the political and the realm of experience. Thus, Meric testifies,
when ballot campaigns politicize issues which do make a difference in people’s lives, they
become  an  efficient  way  for  people  to  “enter  an  organization  and  get  excited.  On
minimum wage [9to5] recruited new members, some of them became board members
who now speak  out  and  are  helping  to  lead  other  organizing  campaigns  that  we’re
involved in” (interview). For Hanna likewise, campaigning on minimum wage was a way
to
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build a sustainable organization of people who know how to do everything I know
how to do, so that ACORN members, if I get hit by a bus, are still going to be able to
sit down and put together an action, negotiate with a target, understand what a
legislative campaign looks like, register voters, do turn-out—all the things that staff
at any organization know how to do.
44 Campaigning for Amendment 42 thus provided a particularly strong incentive, hence a
good opportunity to empower a constituency by “mak[ing] sure that low and moderate-
income  families  know  how  to  struggle  effectively  on  their  own  behalf”  (Hanna:
interview). So, like several other organizations, 9to5 and ACORN do not approach ballot
measures simply as electoral or instrumental goals to reach, but include them in their
broader enfranchising agenda.
45 If the 2006 ballot measures in Colorado were to be approached strictly from an electoral
viewpoint,  the  difference  between  the  Amendment  42  and  Referendum I  campaigns
would seem essentially one of partisanship: because minimum wage was put on the ballot
by the Left, it generated partisan confrontation and a strong incentive for the left of the
political spectrum to mobilize, thus helping the Democrats keep their majority in the
state legislature and win the Governorship.53 According to this logic, because Referendum
I was put on the ballot merely as a reaction against Amendment 43, which was partisan in
origin and intent, it was never meant to be politicized in partisan terms;therefore the
campaign was very cautious never to identify itself as a progressive campaign—any more
than as an LGBT campaign—and it failed in an election where the electorate was split
along  party  lines.  But  tactical  considerations  should  not  make  us  lose  sight  of  the
significance of longer-term strategies: the effort of organizations like ACORN or 9to5 to
raise the minimum wage was not a short-term political “fix”, but part of a long-term
investment—since  at  least  1996—to  actually  improve  living  conditions  for  their
constituents  (Meric:  interview).  For  Lindsey  Hodel,  whereas  partisan  and candidates’
campaigns may have seen minimum wage as a way to turn out Democratic voters, 
we saw that as a way of improving the quality of life for Coloradans—that’s a key
difference  in  approach,  and  a  key  reason  why  non  partisan  community-based
groups are important:  we do tie  issues to election,  and we can use the election
process to get real policy gains for people who are often directly affected by poor
policy. (interview)
46 This statement is interestingly built on opposing “elections” with“policy”, but Hodel’s
point is that the two terms can be reconciled. Far from stigmatizing ballot measures as
electoral ploys which divert progressive organizations from their mission, she perceives
them as means to translate politics into achieving policy thanks to voter empowerment.
47 In  sociological  terms,  the  domestic-partnership  campaign  tended  to  separate  its
protagonists and its audience, whereas the minimum-wage campaign was geared toward
bridging that gap by empowering audiences to become actors. To identify the origin of
that difference, one must turn to the two campaigns’ repertoires of action and organizing
modes. The experience of Michael Huttner offers a good vantage point for comparing the
ways  in  which  they  were  conducted,  since  his  organization,  ProgressNow.org,
volunteered support for both campaigns. ProgressNow.org boasts of having provided the
minimum-wage campaign with sixty to seventy percent of  its  volunteers  through an
“online-to-offline” device whereby a website was set up for people to sign up in support
of Amendment 42 or of Referendum I and their e-mail addresses were then forwarded to
the appropriate campaigns, which could then contact them as volunteers. Huttner notes
that  the  domestic-partnership  campaign  made  very  little  use  of  this  resource.  He
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additionally recalls the difficulties his organization encountered when interacting with
Coloradans for Fairness and Equality.  This,  he believes,  was due to the organization’s
heavily bureaucratic structure,  which occasionally caused delay in the writing out of
press  releases,  for  example,  because  any message  from CFFE had to  be  reviewed by
several  people  before  being made public.54 As  a  result,  says  Huttner,  the  campaign’s
overly top-down management caused it to lose efficiency. This seems paradoxical insofar
as  CFFE’s  organizational  structure  was  designed  with  a  view  to  ensuring  maximum
coordination,  by  avoiding  the  randomness  and  messiness  which  sometimes  impair
grassroots collective action. But, Huttner insists, if it had been organized in a bottom-up
way,  the  domestic-partnership  campaign  could  have  taken  full  advantage  of  the
technological tools his organization offers,  such as a database of 365,000 sympathetic
voters which allows a campaign to send out reminders about turning in their absentee-
ballots  before  the  deadline,  or  information  about  their  specific  voting  location
(interview).
48 Grassroots organizing is the core of the Colorado Progressive Coalition’s idea of social
movement. For Bill Vandenberg, its executive director, CPC:
prioritizes rooting in communities and talking to people at their door,  over the
phone, at their congregation, at their community organization, at their school, at
their beauty salon or their barber-shop: we’ll talk to people where they are about
what issues make a difference in their lives. And we will work to move policy from
that direction, whereas some people sit in a room, and they will poll on some issues
and figure out ‘oh, this looks popular, let’s run that’ (interview).
49 Grassroots then does not mean unplanned or spontaneous:  there is  organization and
leadership behind it, in part thanks to think-tanks such as The Bell, which play a decisive
role in producing the precise scientific data to be used as crucial debating points (Colwell,
2006).  The  point  is  that  grassroots  means  that  the  relationship  between  leadership
(protagonists) and constituency (audience) is reciprocal and horizontal, not one-way and
vertical. Concretely, while it operated on a narrow budget of less than $500,000—to be
compared  with  the  close  to  triple  budget  of  Respect  Colorado’s  Constitution,  the
organization  leading  the  campaign  against  Amendment  42—Coloradans  for  a  Fair
Minimum Wage spent most of its funds on direct mail to voters and its door-to-door
campaign (Vandenberg: interview; Milstead, 2006a; Milstead, 2006b). Vandenberg goes on
to contrast the cost of a field campaign with that of “consultants, TV-ad buyers, people
producing the commercials,  pollsters,  the  people  who are  producing the over-priced
glossy  materials  that  are  going  to  get  mailed  out,  the  robocalls.”  CPC  and  other
organizations’ expertise in going door to door and talking to people, he believes, is what
made it possible for Coloradans for a Fair Minimum Wage to win Amendment 42 despite
being outspent almost three to one by its opponents (interview).
50 This model of campaigning stands in sharp contrast with Coloradans for Fairness and
Equality’s highly professional staff and $4.2 million budget. Vandenberg claims that “they
had a ton of consultants that did a lot of polling, but in the end it didn’t pass because it
didn’t really have a strong field presence on the ground” (Vandenberg: interview). This
assessment is confirmed by several campaigners for CFFE: whereas field campaigning was
initially emphasized during the first semester of 2006 in order to gather petitions for
Amendment 45 (Glennon:  interview),  it  was interrupted during the Summer—when it
became certain that the “dirty version” of the gay-marriage ban was not making it onto
the ballot and Amendment 45 was consequently withdrawn. At this time polling results
were very encouraging, so that there was a reasonably optimistic sense that voters knew
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about Referendum I and would support it in the polls, provided the public’s attention be
sustained (Clark: interview; Brewer: interview). So “the campaign became increasingly
focused primarily on a paid-media effort,” says Clark (interview), and the issue was on the
public’s  mind.  Morris  Price,  national  leadership  development  officer  at  the  Gill
Foundation, a major LGBT community leader who was a CFFE volunteer, recalls:
there was a whole population [within the gay community] who really thought that
as long as they talked about it and they felt confident about it, it was the same thing
as changing it. But if you asked them had they registered to vote? ‘No’. Had you
moved your vote from one place to the next when you moved so that it would be
updated? ‘Oh no, I haven’t done that yet.’ They would take it for granted that the
process  would  automatically  work  in  their favor  and  that  this  would  be  won
(interview).
51 While essentially agreeing with the way the campaign was run, Price corroborates the
lack of civic engagement which other, more critical interviewees blame on the top-down
nature of CFFE. Clark, for instance, recalls a widespread, albeit diffuse sense among the
LGBT community that, since advertisements were to be seen on television, somehow the
issue was being taken care of (interview).
52 Conversely, while emphasizing that a mainstreaming message was the proper choice for
the Referendum I campaign, Michael Brewer holds that what
the campaign did not do was connect well with the GLBT community in an organic,
grassroots way. And I think that ultimately that hurt it. Not that it was a question of
messaging,  but  the energy behind the campaign would have been different  and
more effective had even the small number of people within the GLBT community
been more deeply engaged. (interview)
53 Price recalls mobilizing to create such engagement among African Americans and among
younger gays: the latter especially was an audience of great potential which had yet to be
tapped. At one event he organized, his father, a straight black man in his sixties, spoke
out vibrantly to an African American audience against Amendment 43; at another event
in  a  gay  bar,  patrons  who  would  register  to  vote  would  get  a  free  drink  coupon
(interview). But such grassroots efforts remained low-key and uncoordinated, whereas,
says Brewer, “after [the signature-gathering] effort was completed, I  don’t think that
there was an effective effort by the campaign to keep [the volunteers] engaged. They did
their job, and went back to their daily lives, and the professional campaign took over”
(interview).  The  issue  of  civic  engagement  is  thus  literally  one  of  movement:  on  the
contrary, our interviewees’ descriptions of the domestic-partnership campaign convey a
static image of a mass organizing effort which, instead of getting the rank and file excited
or mobilized, ultimately existed independently from them.
54 The two campaigns’ approaches to the media sum up the differences we have explored so
far.  Referendum I  relied  on  paid  media,  buying  advertisement  time on television  in
particular, whereas the Amendment 42 campaign—partly for lack of sufficient funds, but
also  out  of  strategic  choice—preferred  “earned”  media,  creating  events  to  draw the
media’s attention and get coverage. When the petitions for Amendment 42 were brought
to the Secretary of State’s office on August 3,  2006, for example, the countless boxes
containing them were physically carried in by several dozen marchers wearing ACORN t-
shirts, who held a public rally and delivered speeches on the state Capitol’s front-steps
(Henley,  2006).55 Thus,  whereas  the  domestic-partnership  audience  was  only  on  the
receiving  end  of  the  media  effort,  continuity  is  what  characterized  the  relationship
between the minimum-wage campaign’s audience and protagonists. To put it differently,
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the former treated voters as clients, whereas the latter regarded them as potential actors
who needed to be engaged.
55 This is partly due to structural factors. The coalition which initiated Amendment 42 was
made up of fairly long-standing grassroots organizations, whereas the LGBT community
in Colorado is essentially structured on the ground by social institutions while its political
matters  rest  in  the  hands  of  delegates  in  the  Democratic  Party  and  sympathetic
government bodies, or at the Gill Foundation and its 501(c)(4) branch Gill Action.56 The
minimum-wage coalition thus had experience investing some of its resources in grants
and  stipends  to  community  organizations  to  wage  the  campaign,  building  an
infrastructure  that  would  continue  to  exist  all  the  way  to  Election  Day  and  beyond
(Vandenberg: interview): it used the ballot campaign’s short-term imperatives to serve
the long-term goal of community-based movement-building. The domestic-partnership
umbrella organization, on the contrary, was a purely ad hoc endeavor devoid of prior
existence, let alone an overall movement-building political agenda. Hence Michael
Brewer’s deepest regret about the Referendum I campaign is “that it wasn’t used at the
same  time  to  build  an  infrastructure  which  would  have  strengthened  the  GLBT
community,  which  would  have  strengthened  the  ongoing  process  of  community
organization both in the GLBT community and beyond the GLBT community” (interview).
In  other  words,  the  minimum-wage  campaign  was  nurtured  by,  and  reinforced,  an
already  existing  grassroots  social-movement  field,  whereas  the  domestic-partnership
campaign failed to be seized as an opportunity to create such a social-movement field.
56 Commitment and active civic engagement are key to social movement building, which
was not ignored by CFFE. Denise Whinnen for instance says:
I do understand that we probably could have done some more work on the ground;
we were part of collaborative efforts that were happening on the ground, so we felt
like  we—through these  collaborations—met  our  goals  in  terms of  who we were
door-knocking to, who we were talking to via the phone: we did hit those targets.
(interview)
57 CFFE indeed dedicated significant resources to its coalition-building effort, with outreach
coordinators to various constituencies, such as ethnic or religious communities. The job
of Maria De Cambra, CFFE’s outreach coordinator with the Latino community, was to call
Latino organizations and leaders, attend Latino community events in order to “educate
that community on the issues and then ask them to support actively the work that we
were  doing.”  Her  efforts  yielded  more  than  seventy  endorsements  from  top  Latino
community leaders (De Cambra: interview). Nevertheless,  getting endorsements is not
tantamount  to  securing  commitment.  And  because  of  its  top-down  structure  CFFE
requested backing, but did not integrate its supporters into the strategic initiative.57 As a
result,  the  endorsements—numerous  and  significant  though  they  were—could  not
amount to engagement on the part of the constituencies in question. For Michael Brewer,
who  was  in  charge  of  the  faith-based  outreach,  getting  formal  endorsements  is  not
sufficient,  because it  “is no substitute for going into a church community,  talking to
members of that church community, preaching to them, distributing materials to them
after a church service—that did not happen [in the Referendum I campaign]” (interview).
Ru Johnson, who participated in CFFE’s outreach to the African American community,
likewise  expresses  surprise  that  many  resources  were  not  tapped  into:  “cultural
institutions,  faith-based  institutions,  the  Pan-Hellenic  council—Black  fraternities  and
sororities—the Black poetry scene in Denver, which is very liberal, very gay, very active—
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that’s  a  resource  that  we  did  not  explore,  and  that  would  have  made  a  difference”
(interview).
58 So even within coalition-building an analytical distinction should be made between top-
down and grassroots organizing.  It  corresponds to very tangible differences in social
movement  structure  and repertoire  of  action,  which  in  turn  link  up  to  longer-term
processes of movement continuity, as illustrated in this statement by Ben Hanna:
The  more  that  you  get  people  kind  of  pulled  in—so  the  people  that  voted  on
minimum wage, that were pulled into organizations and deep in relationships with
people and talk about voting and other issues etcetera—I think then it’s easier to
start having conversations and finding some common ground on some of the issues
that traditionally would be seen as more divisive. For example in our communities,
a lot of our members are older African Americans, devoutly religious, and a lot of
people come up to us and say ‘so your members are basically against GLBT rights.’
But I actually don’t think that’s true. […] A lot of our members who came from the
Civil Rights movement get civil rights, and if you sit down and have a conversation,
people can see where there’s common ground, and where there are ties that bond,
and you find them in the most unlikely places. So it’s just a matter of making sure
our  members  have  those  kinds  of  conversations  with  members  of  other
organizations (interview).
59 Particularly interesting in this statement is the recurrence of the word “conversation”—
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as an “interchange of thoughts and words”—,
which indeed implies parity and reciprocity. This suggests that coalition-building must
meet  these  two  criteria  if  apparently  impassable  barriers  are  to  be  surmounted  or
brought down, rather than circumvented. But just as importantly, “conversation” also
implies  an  interpersonal  interaction,  which  brings  us  back  to  our  remarks  above
concerning personalized politics, seen now from the vantage point of organizing.
60 Ru Johnson thus recalls going to Amendment 42 rallies with “a dozen people on that stage
telling about how they don’t have health-care, how they’re not able to pay their rent
etcetera, etcetera, etcetera,” and feeling that “there was this element of passion that was
missing” in the Referendum I campaign. From the standpoint of framing, this is due—as
we have seen—to the political risk involved in talking about LGBT issues, which were put
forth in fairly abstract and subtle terms by the domestic-partnership campaign. However,
Johnson believes, “if we could have added some more passion, and some more personal
conviction,  personal  commitment  to  the  [Referendum  I]  movement  in  terms  of  our
display of that, we would have been able to reach a lot, a lot more people” (interview).
This is of particular relevance at this point in our analysis, because it paradoxically leads
us to draw a distinction between a personalized message and a personalized repertoire of
action.  The  domestic-partnership  campaign  was  indeed  intentionally  disimpassioned,
insofar as its organizers were intent on making sure that Referendum I did not become a
vote for or against homosexuality. Interestingly Johnson does not challenge that, even as
she deplores the lack of passion in the campaign. When evoking minimum-wage rallies
with people sharing their experience, she says: “Those are very passionate issues, but at
the same time we know someone who stood in the waiting-room while their partner died
in a hospital but they weren’t able to visit them. But it’s difficult to convey that message
when in the first place this is seen as a rough, tough, and sturdy legislative campaign”
(interview). As a matter of fact stories of people standing in the waiting-room while their
partners  died  were  part  of  the  Referendum  I  campaign’s  message—in  the  above-
mentioned “waiting-room” television advertisement for instance—and Johnson probably
draws her inspiration for this example from such advertisements and arguments. But
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Johnson aptly says it is “difficult”, not “impossible”, to convey that message, so the issue
is less what message to convey than how to convey it. What she means to point out is
therefore not so much a lack of passion in the message, as of embodiment of that message in
people and their experience.
61 As this example shows, framing is indeed predicated upon a movement’s repertoire of
action,  which  is  in  turn  inseparable  from  its  organizational  operating  mode  (Hunt,
Benford and Snow, 1994). But whereas our fieldwork clearly imputes the shortcomings of
the domestic-partnership campaign to its top-down structure, the 2006 experience seems
to have generated some awareness of these issues. For instance, even though the Gill
Foundation and Gill Action were not technically in charge of the Referendum I campaign,
they were closely linked with it, especially in material terms of funding and staff, but also
symbolically due to the Gill  Foundation’s visibility as the state’s largest,  most funded
LGBT organization.  Although Coloradans for Fairness and Equality disbanded, the Gill
Foundation has since been operating in a context marked by the outcome of the 2006
domestic-partnership  campaign and outcome.  And it  has  engaged in  more  authentic
coalition-building efforts than CFFE did in 2006. The Gay and Lesbian Fund for Colorado
(GLFC), a Gill Foundation program which only funds non-LGBT progressive and cultural
initiatives  in  Colorado,  has  since  2006  reinforced  its  contribution  to  the  Colorado
Community  Organizing  Collaborative  (CCOC),  a  collaborative  effort  among  nine
community organizations in Colorado to foster grassroots community organizing in the
fields of health-care reform, immigrant rights, educational reform, economic justice, and
affirmative action.58 According to Denise Whinnen, this is
an attempt for various organizations to learn how to work cross-issue, and at the
same time it was a change for foundations in terms of not calling the shots, not
pushing the agenda, not to encourage a mission drift at these organizations, but
really working on a level playing field where there wasn’t so much power dynamic
going  on,  so  that  they  would  learn  ‘how  can  we  really  best  support  these
organizations’  work,  and  their  very  needs’.  So  it  was  the  first  time  that
philanthropic  and  organizing  people  started  to  figure  out  how  to  work  more
effectively on a level playing field, versus ‘we have all the money and we want you
to do all the work’ (interview).
62 Although CCOC was launched in 2004, it was then still in its infancy, and “we were still in
the very beginning stages of understanding collaboration,” says Whinnen (interview).
This suggests that coalition-building lessons were learned from the 2006 Referendum I
campaign (Gurule: interview).
63 As  coalition-building  illustrates,  the  existence  of  a  deeply-ingrained  grassroots
organizing  structure  was  therefore  a  precondition  for  progressive  movements  in
Colorado to be able to appropriate the 2006 ballot campaigns in such a way as to serve
their agenda, rather than be diverted from it. Our fieldwork shows that the preexistence
of a personalized form of social movement organizing is not simply a crucial strategic
advantage for convincing ordinary people to cast their votes either one way or the other.
When  there  was  a  social  movement  field  with  organizations  doing  grassroots
enfranchisement  and  civic  engagement  as  part  of  their  habitual  agenda,  these
organizations  could  indeed  use  ballot  measures  to  give  such  work  urgency,  hence
momentum, and public exposure. Ballot measures were thus part of a natural continuum
with this work; but ballot measures could not create such a field ex nihilo. In other words,
for ballot measures to be productive for progressive social movements, the organizing
needs to have happened before an issue is on the ballot, so that a ballot issue campaign
Issue-Choice, Messaging, and Organizing: A Sociological Approach to Three Bal...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2011
22
should correspond to in-depth organizing, rather than merely reactive, short-term, ad hoc
activism. If we envision the 2006 situation sociologically from the standpoint of social
movements, there is therefore little question that spending on long-term organizing is
more worthwhile than purchasing thirty-second television ads in an emergency situation.
According to Huttner, for instance, the budget of an organization like ProgressNow.org
for  five  permanent  staff-members  year-long is  equivalent  to  the  cost  of  five  days of
television ads in September of an election year (interview). Thus, in order to grasp ballot
measures’ significance for progressive social movements it is critical to envision them in
terms of forms of organizing and repertoires of action which underlie the campaigns.
 
Conclusion: the importance of long-term grassroots
organizing
64 Studying the minimum-wage and domestic-partnership campaigns in Colorado in 2006
convincingly presents ballot measures as both a challenge and a double-edged sword for
progressive social  movements.  They may either divert the action of social-movement
organizations  from  their  long-term  goals,  or,  if  campaigns  are  driven  through  an
authentic grassroots effort, they can become an opportunity for placing their politics in
the voters’ hands, thus answering the Progressive Era call for citizen lawmaking. At any
rate, ballot measures never quite amount to direct democracy, because voter education is
never foolproof, but they do have the potential for empowering voters to make conscious,
informed  political  decisions  about  issues  that  matter  to  them.  A  crucial  question  is
therefore  what  kind  of  organizing  underlies  a  ballot  campaign:  its  deeper  political
significance can be reliably interpreted from whether the campaign is an isolated, ad hoc,
somewhat reactive endeavor, or part of a broader grassroots movement with a longer-
term agenda. Thus, social movement organizing modes and repertoires of action are the
appropriate angle for a sociological assessment of the significance of ballot measures. To
put it differently, what happens in the polls is most often but the electoral tip of an
iceberg whose less visible foundations are the work which social-movement organizations
do outside of, or in between, election cycles.
65 The recurrence of ballot measures in such places as Colorado is an ongoing source of
stress for progressive social-movement organizations. It drains sizeable resources into
often reactive  politics.  But  at  the same time,  direct  democracy not  only  keeps  their
supporters mobilized, which may avoid their slipping into complacent inactivity: it also
puts a premium on long-term, grassroots movement-building. That is precisely the type
of grassroots organizing which the Right has been so efficient at developing, through
churches  in  particular,  since the  1970s,  and  which  contributes  to  their  success  in
initiating  ballot  measures.  This  suggests  how  crucial  it  is  for  progressive  social
movements to look and learn from conservatives,  who have proven to be masters at
mobilizing from the bottom up.
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Appendix 1: list of interviews
Conducted in 2008
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Name Date Title Organization
Brewer, Michael April 2,
2008 (2008) Executive
Director
Brett Family Foundation
(2006) Legal
Director
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender (GLBT)
Community Center of Colorado (The Center)
Clark, Bobby April 3,
2008
Deputy Director ProgressNowAction
De Cambra,
Maria 
April 1,
2008 (2008) Program Coordinator Latina Initiative
(2006) Hispanic / Latino Outreach
Director
Coloradans for Fairness and Equality
(CFFE)
Feustel, Jane April 1,
2008
Community Organizer Colorado Progressive Action
(CPA)
Glennon, Hope April 4,
2008
Volunteer Coloradans for Fairness and
Equality (CFFE)
Groke, Katie April 3,
2008
Public Affairs Coordinator Planned Parenthood of the
Rocky Mountains (PPRM)
Gurule, Dusti April 3,
2008
Executive Director Latina Initiative
Hanna, Ben March
28, 2008
State Director for Colorado Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN)
Hazouri, Cathryn April 2,
2008
Executive Director American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Colorado
Hodel, Lindsey April 2,
2008
Field Director Colorado Progressive Coalition
(CPC)
Huttner, Michael April 1,
2008
Executive Director ProgressNow.org
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Johnson, James April 4,
2008 (2008) Civic Engagement
Director
Colorado Progressive Coalition (CPC)
(2006) Political Director Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
Local 105
Johnson, Ru March
31, 2008
Volunteer Coordinator and
Get-out-the-Vote Director for
District 2
Coloradans for Fairness and
Equality (CFFE)
Jones, Rich April 3,
2008
Director of Policy and
Research
Bell Policy Center (The Bell)
Klawitter, Daniel April 3,
2008 (2008) Religious Outreach Organizer FRESC: Good Jobs, Strong
Communities
(2006) Union Organizer for Mental
Healthcare Workers
Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) Local 105
Kron, Joanne April 4,
2008
Communications Officer Gill Foundation
Gill Action
McMaster, Terry April 4,
2008
Director Lutheran Advocacy Ministry
(LAM) of Colorado
Meric, Linda March
31, 2008
National Executive Director 9to5 National Organization of
Working Women
Price, Morris April 1,
2008 (2008) Program Officer Gill Foundation
(2006) Volunteer Coloradans for Fairness and Equality (CFFE)
Shaw, Jeffrey April 5,
2008
Chairman Colorado Stonewall Democrats
Steadman, Pat March
29, 2008
Political Consultant Mendez & Steadman
Thormodsgaard,
Jeff
March
29, 2008
Political Consultant Mendez & Steadman
Vandenberg, Bill March
28, 2008
Co-Executive Director Colorado Progressive Coalition
(CPC)
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Whinnen, Denise April 4,
2008 (2008) Deputy Director Gay and Lesbian Fund for Colorado (GLFC)
(2006) Deputy Director Coloradans for Fairness and Equality (CFFE)
 
Appendix 2: list of organizations
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Colorado
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN)
Bell Policy Center (The Bell)
Brett Family Foundation
Coloradans for a Fair Minimum Wage
Coloradans for Fairness and Equality (CFFE)
Colorado Community Organizing Collaborative (CCOC)
Colorado Progressive Action (CPA)
Colorado Progressive Coalition (CPC)
Colorado Stonewall Democrats
501(c)(3) Roundtable
Front Range Economic Strategy Center / FRESC: Good Jobs, Strong Communities
Gay and Lesbian Fund for Colorado (GLFC)
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender (GLBT) Community Center of Colorado (The
Center)
Gill Action
Gill Foundation
Latina Initiative
Let Justice Roll
Lutheran Advocacy Ministry (LAM) of Colorado
Mendez & Steadman
9to5 National Organization of Working Women
Philanthropic Community Organizing Collaborative (PCOC)
Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains
ProgressNowAction
ProgressNow.org
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 105
Women’s Voices Women’s Vote
 
Appendix 3: interview support questions
On the 2006 campaign
How did you / your organization get involved in the 2006 ballot measure campaign?
What was your / your organization’s contribution to the 2006 campaign?
You / your organization focused primarily on the minimum wage [domestic partnership]
campaign; did you / it also contribute to the domestic partnership [minimum wage]
campaign?
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Did you see a lot of coalition take place between the domestic partnership and minimum
wage campaigns in 2006?
What types of campaign events did you / your organization put together?
Did you find that the campaign for Referendum I / Amendment 42 was defensive, or
offensive?
Do you think certain things should have been done differently?
 
On the political significance of ballot measures
Did campaigning on a ballot measure differ from the type of work you / your
organization usually do(es)?
Do you think ballot measures are basically get-out-the-vote strategies that benefit
political parties rather than progressive movements?
Do you see the campaign on ballot measures having long-term effects on progressive
movement organizing—beneficial, or detrimental ones?
Does campaigning on ballot measures somehow force organizations like yours to adopt
short-term, rather than long-term strategies?
Does campaigning on ballot measures somehow force organizations like yours to adopt
defensive, rather than offensive strategies?
Would you agree that having to campaign about ballot measures tends to divert
progressive social movements’ energies away from the real work they should do?
Do you see ballot measures as a way to effectively advance progressive causes?
NOTES
1.  Such is the focus of a wealth of political science literature on the topic—discussed in this issue
by Donna Kesselman.
2. We wish to thank Donna Kesselman for pointing out this coincidence, and thus launching us on
this stimulating case-study.
3. A list of interviewees and organizations, and the interviews’ support questions are provided in
the appendices to this article.
4.  Popular approval then substitutes for gubernatorial signature (Colorado State Constitution V,
1:4).
5. “The ‘citizen referendum’ came in two forms. The ‘citizen initiative’ was invented to address
legislative  omissions,  while  the  ‘referendum  petition’  was  invented  to  address  legislative
commissions (acts that overreach).” (Polhill 2006, 3; emphasis mine)
6.  “Amendment  42.  Colorado  Minimum  Wage:  An  amendment  to  the  Colorado  constitution
concerning  the  state  minimum  wage,  and,  in  connection  therewith,  increasing  Colorado’s
minimum wage to $ 6.85 per hour, adjusted annually for inflation, and providing that no more
than $ 3.02 per hour in tip income may be used to offset the minimum wage of employees who
regularly  receive tips.”  (source:  Colorado Legislative  Council,  “Chronological  Listing of  Ballot
Issues”:  http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf [unless  specified  otherwise  all  Web
pages were last visited on August 2, 2010])
7. These were: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah; additionally, Louisiana and Arkansas passed such amendments at a
different date. 
8. These were: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wisconsin; additionally, Alabama passed such an amendment at a different date.
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9. “Amendment  45.  Domestic  Partnerships:  An  amendment  to  the  Colorado  constitution
concerning the establishment of domestic partnerships, and, in connection therewith, declaring
that domestic partnerships do not affect the institution of marriage between one man and one
woman,  stating  that  notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  law  a  domestic  partnership  is
established as a unique and valid relationship between eligible adults of the same sex and is not
similar  to  marriage,  and  directing  the  general  assembly  to  enact  implementing  legislation
consistent  with  the  responsibilities,  benefits,  and  protections  and  licensing  provisions  for
domestic  partnerships  set  forth  in  House  Bill  06-1344  as  passed  by  the  Colorado  general
assembly.” (source: ibid.)
10. “Amendment  43.  Marriage:  An  amendment  to  the  Colorado  constitution,  concerning
marriage, and, in connection therewith, specifying that only a union of one man and one woman
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Colorado.” (source: ibid.)
11. “Referendum I. Domestic Partnerships: Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado Revised
Statutes  to  authorize  domestic  partnerships,  and,  in  connection  therewith,  enacting  the
‘Colorado Domestic Partnership Benefits And Responsibilities Act’ to extend to same-sex couples
in  a  domestic  partnership  the  benefits,  protections,  and responsibilities  that  are  granted  by
Colorado  law  to  spouses,  providing  the  conditions  under  which  a  license  for  a  domestic
partnership  may  be  issued  and  the  criteria  under  which  a  domestic  partnership  may  be
dissolved,  making  provisions  for  implementation  of  the  act,  and  providing  that  a  domestic
partnership is not a marriage, which consists of the union of one man and one woman?” (source:
ibid.)
12. In 2000 the Colorado General Assembly passed HB00-1249 “An Act Concerning Strengthening
of the Marriage Relationship” which specifies that “a marriage is valid in this state if […] it is only
between one man and one woman” (source: Office of Legislative Legal Services, “Session Laws of
Colorado”,  Denver,  Colorado  General  Assembly,  http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/
session_laws_of_colorado.htm).
13. As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  2008,  all  three  states  where  marriage-related  constitutional
amendments were on the ballot, and got approved—Arizona, California and Florida—already had
statutory bans on same-sex unions. Florida’s Proposition 2 had been three years in the making,
and Arizona’s Proposition 102 was a renewed attempt after Proposition 105 failed in 2006, but
California’s Proposition 8 is different insofar as it was a response to the state Supreme Court’s
May 2008 decision In  re  Marriage  Cases,  which struck down the state’s  statutory ban,  making
California  the  second  state  after  Massachusetts  to  legalize  same-sex  marriage.  So,  whereas
proponents of the gay-marriage ban in Massachusetts had decided not to put a constitutional
amendment in the 2008 ballot—after failing to do so in 2006—for fear of a defeat, California’s
Proposition 8 was a successful attempt to reverse in the polls the judicial legalization of same-sex
marriage. For an interpretation of the 2008 California Proposition 8 vote in terms of a religious
divide within the Democratic electorate see Miller.
14. On “wedge issues” see the contribution by Donna Kesselman in this issue.
15. The organization coordinating that campaign was alternatively called Say No to 43 and Don’t
Mess with Marriage, and worked on a relatively low budget of $ 350,000—compared to the $
900,000 budget of Coloradans for Marriage, which led the campaign both for Amendment 43 and
against  Referendum I,  and the $ 4.2  million budget  of  the campaign for Referendum I  (Kim,
2006b).
16.  The two were sometimes done at the same time, since one must be a registered voter to sign
a petition. Signatures were gathered at civic venues such as political events, but also at festivals,
farmers’ markets etc.
17.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Latina Initiative for example created a
bilingual voting guide; ProgressNow.org and the Bell Policy Center made theirs available online
Issue-Choice, Messaging, and Organizing: A Sociological Approach to Three Bal...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2011
32
and printed them out for door-to-door distribution and to be handed out near polling stations:
the Bell issued 10,000 copies of its voting guide, ProgressNow.org issued 300,000 copies.
18.  FRESC was created by the Denver Area Labor Federation, the AFL-CIO’s central labor council
for  the  Denver  metropolitan  Area,  and  is  now  identified  as  “FRESC:  Good  Jobs,  Strong
Communities”. It is a nonprofit organization which coordinates community-based efforts of the
labor movement and the no-profit sector to improve living, working, and housing standards (see:
http://www.fresc.org).
19.  ProgressNow.org  is  a  nonpartisan,  nonprofit  organization  whose  mission  is  to  provide
progressive campaigns and organizations in Colorado with online and communication tools (see:
http://www.progressnow.org).
20.  The Gay and Lesbian Fund for Colorado is a program of the Gill Foundation, whose goal is to
provide funding for progressive and cultural nonprofit organizations and programs in Colorado.
The Gill Foundation was created by Tim Gill, a wealthy businessman from Colorado who is gay
and decided to come out in support of gay and lesbian rights in the wake of the 1992 Amendment
2,  a  ballot  initiative  which  made  it  unconstitutional  to  set  up  anti-discrimination  policies
inclusive of sexual orientation (Amendment 2 was struck down by the United States Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans in 1996). Whereas the Gill Foundation specifically focuses on LGBT rights,
the  Gay  and  Lesbian  Fund  for  Colorado  targets  non-LGBT  organizations  (see:  http://
www.gillfoundation.org and http://www.gillfoundation.org/glfchome).
21. The Colorado Progressive Coalition engages in a wide variety of political activities to promote
racial  justice,  health  care,  fair  taxes,  and  voter  empowerment,  including  sponsoring  ballot
measures such as Amendment 42 in 2006 (see: http://www.progressivecoalition.org). 
22. The proposed amendment (Amendment 46) on the 2008 ballot was entitled “Discrimination
and Preferential Treatment by Governments” (source: Colorado Legislative Council, “2008 Ballot
Analysis  Text  &  Deadlines”:  http://www.leg.state.co.us/LCS/
InitRefr/0708InitRefr.nsf/89FB842D0401C52087256CBC00650696).  It  was  defeated  by  a  narrow
margin (50.7 percent).
23. On geographical  biases in the ballot-initiative process,  see:  D.  Smith 2007,  1402-16.  For a
critical assessment of the initiative and referendum process, see: Magleby.
24. The Bell Policy Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit progressive public policy center, a think-
tank doing research and advocacy on policies to promote opportunity in Colorado (see: http://
www.bellpolicy.org).
25. The issue was particularly acute as in the 2008 election Amendment 48 proposed to amend
the  constitution  of  Colorado  to  define  a  human  egg  as  a  person  “from  the  moment  of
fertilization” (source: Colorado Legislative Council, “2008 Ballot Analysis Text & Deadlines”). It
was defeated by a broad margin (73.2 percent) in 2008. A similar measure, Amendment 62, was
defeated by a comparable margin (71 percent) in 2010.
26. Lutheran Advocacy Ministry is one of twenty state public policy offices of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church of America (ELCA), and it conducts grassroots legislative advocacy mainly on
issues of poverty, but also on such cultural issues as the death penalty (see: http://www.lam-
co.org).
27.  On citizens’ confusion with regard to ballot measures, see: Gastil, Reedy, and Wells 1440-49.
On the interplay between ballot measures and the legislative process, see: D. Smith, 2001.
28.  SB07-060 “An Act Concerning the Availability of Emergency Contraception to a Survivor of a
Sexual Assault” (source: Office of Legislative Legal Services, “Session Laws of Colorado”, Denver,
Colorado  General  Assembly,  http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/
session_laws_of_colorado.htm).
29.  SB07-025 “An Act Concerning the Expansion of Employment Nondiscrimination Protections,
and Making an Appropriation therefor” (source: ibid.).
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30.  HB07-1330 “An Act Concerning the Second-Parent Adoption of a Child of a Sole Legal Parent”
(source: ibid.).
31. Quantitative  studies  nevertheless  suggest  that  ballot  measures  do  not  intrinsically
discriminate against minorities (Donovan and Bowler, 1998; Hajnal, Gerber and Louch, 2002).
32. Following Lewis v. Harris, New Jersey created civil unions in February 2007, but its domestic
partnership statute remains in place.
33. It was revealed that Ted Haggard, pastor and founder of the New Life Church in Colorado
Springs, president of the National Association of Evangelicals, and arch opponent of LGBT rights,
had regularly been having paid sexual encounters with a male prostitute.
34. ProgressNowAction is  an extension of  ProgressNow.org (see  footnote  14).  The latter  is  a
nonprofit organization whose donors benefit from tax-exemptions under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal  Revenue Code,  which means that  it  may not,  “as  a  substantial  part  of  its  activities,
attempt to influence legislation […] or participate to any extent in a political campaign for or
against  any candidate for public  office” (Internal  Revenue Service,  Publication 557:  Tax-Exempt
Status  for  Your  Organization (June  2008),  chapter  3:  “Section  501(c)(3)  Organizations”, http://
www.irs.gov/publications/p557/ch03.html). To circumvent this limitation ProgressNow.org set
up a separate organization under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which grants
tax exemptions for organization which are “not organized for profit and [are] operated only to
promote social welfare”: provided that it “is organized exclusively to promote social welfare” a
501(c)(4) organization “may still obtain exemption even if it participates legally in some political
activity on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for public office” (Ibid.,  chapter 4: “Other
Section  501(c)  Organizations”,  http://www.irs.gov/publications/p557/ch04.html).
ProgressNowAction is thus legally able to participate more directly in political campaigns, and to
lobby for legislation.
35. The  Colorado Stonewall  Democrats  is  the  state  affiliate  of  the  LGBT network within  the
Democratic Party (see: http://www.stonewalldems.org).
36. 9to5, National Association of Working Women was founded in 1973—its Colorado affiliate in
1996—and defines its mission as building “a movement to achieve economic justice, by engaging
directly affected women to improve working conditions” (see: http://www.9to5.org).
37. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) is an organization of
low- and moderate-income families, which was created in 1970 (its Colorado affiliate in 1977),
and  works  on  such  issues  as  wages,  credits,  housing,  public  schools,  through  direct  action,
negotiation,  legislative advocacy and voter participation (see:  http://www.acorn.org).  In 2008
and 2009 ACORN was at the center of a controversy when conservative Republicans accused it of
encouraging tax evasion and prostitution, so that Congress decided to deny it federal subsidies;
hostility and lack of funds caused ACORN to all but cease its activity in 2010.
38. “Seven Days at Minimum Wage”, http://www.sevendaysatminimumwage.org (last accessed
October 8, 2009).
39. The Latina Initiative was created in 2002 in order to enhance the civic involvement of Latinas
in Colorado (see: http://www.latinainitiative.org).
40. By that time however, the above-mentioned constitutional impasse was not the campaign’s
goal anymore, since the provisions of Amendment 43 and Referendum I could coexist (Zeller,
2006): the goal had become the actual creation of domestic partnerships.
41. The Brett Family Foundation is a private charity organization which provides funding for
Colorado nonprofits  working for social  justice,  and charities serving disadvantaged people in
Boulder (see: http://www.brettfoundation.org).
42. The advertisement may be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VjlV9nzPu_A.
43. The advertisement may be viewed at:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2y3rpPn3IN0.
44. Gay-marriage  bans  were  approved  by  comparable  margins  in  Virginia  (57  percent)  and
Wisconsin (59 percent), but with much higher margins in Idaho (63 percent), South Carolina (78
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percent)  and Tennessee  (81  percent).  Only  South  Dakota  passed  it  by  a  somewhat  narrower
margin (52 percent).
45.  As a matter of fact, the anti-gay marriage amendment’s defeat in Arizona—the only state
where this happened—is partly ascribed to the very presence of Referendum I on the ballot in
Colorado, since it drained conservative funds and energies away from Arizona into neighboring
Colorado in order to secure the effectiveness of Amendment 43 by making sure that referendum I
should get defeated (Brewer: interview). A similar constitutional amendment was approved in
2008 (see footnotes 13 above and 48 below).
46. One grants protection for employees sharing wage information, to help fight against pay
discrimination. The second one provides accommodation for breast-feeding on the workplace,
which  helps  secure  mothers’  early  return  to  work.  The  third  one  expands  unemployment
insurance  benefits  to  workers  who  lose  their  job  because  they  relocate  with  an  active-duty
military spouse (Meric: interview).
47. Colorado Progressive Action is the 501(c)(4) arm of the Colorado Progressive Coalition (see
footnote 29).
48. “Proposition  107:  An  initiative  measure  proposing  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  of
Arizona by adding Article XXX relating to the protection of marriage” (source: Arizona Secretary
of State, “2006 General Election Ballot Measures”, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/
ballotmeasures.htm). As a matter of fact, Proposition 102, which got approved in the 2008 ballot,
did not affect the recognition of unmarried different-sex couples as it  merely stated “only a
union of  one man and one woman shall  be  valid  or  recognized as  a  marriage in  this  state”
(source:  Arizona Secretary of State,  “2008 Ballot Measure / Proposition Information”,  http://
www.azsos.gov/election/2008/general/BallotMeasurePage.htm).
49. The  catch-phrase  was  visible  on  all  campaign  material  distributed  by  the  various
organizations involved in the campaign. 
50. Women’s Voices Women Vote is a national organization dedicated to improving the electoral
participation of unmarried women, one of the demographics least represented in elections (see:
http://www.wvwv.org).
51.  Of the organizations we approached, CPC, 9to5, Latina Initiative and the ACLU are the only
four which campaigned both on minimum wage and domestic partnership, though not evenly:
CPC thus campaigned primarily on minimum wage, but carried domestic-partnership literature
door to door. Besides, other organizations, such as SEIU, supported both ballot measures and
opposed Amendment 43 (Klawitter: interview, James Johnson: interview).
52. The  501(c)(3)  Roundtable  is  a  coalition  of  Colorado  nonpartisan  nonprofit  organizations
committed to increasing their membership’s civic participation.
53. For an argument about the sustained relevance of partisanship, see Brewer.
54. In all fairness, it must again be noted that there are structural reasons for the Referendum I
campaign’s being more top-down than the Amendment 42 campaign. As stated earlier by Ru
Johnson, the issues involved in the recognition of same-sex couples were relatively abstract and
subtle to argue for, whereas the rationale for raising the minimum wage was easy for rank-and-
file voters to grasp (interview). This partly explains why there was so much caution on the part
of CFFE to monitor the message for domestic partnership, which could easily be distorted into
what it was not—namely marriage.
55. A video of the event may be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_UfnBE0hPA.
56.  On 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations see footnote 33.
57. On the contrary, Coloradans for a Fair Minimum Wage’s faith-based outreach translated in
religious  organizations  being  decision-making  partners  in  the  minimum-wage  campaign
(McMaster: interview; Klawitter: interview). A good illustration of this coalition-building work is
Let Justice Roll, a coalition of 92 faith and community organizations for a fair living wage, in
which ACORN, CPC, and the AFL-CIO take part (see: http://letjusticeroll.org).
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58. CCOC is funded by the Philanthropic Community Organizing Collaborative (PCOC), itself a
program of eleven foundations—including the Gill Foundation and the Ford Foundation—which is
meant  to  channel  philanthropic  funding  toward  collaborative  endeavors  among  community
organizing  groups  working  for  social  justice  (see:  http://www.piton.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Content.Support_to_Community_Organizing).
RÉSUMÉS
Cet article étudie deux campagnes référendaires au Colorado en 2006, qui obtinrent des résultats
apparemment  contradictoires.  L’analyse  de  cet  exemple  particulier  permet  de  tirer  des
enseignements sur les conséquences pour les mouvements sociaux progressistes de ces formes de
démocratie directe : détournent-elles les mouvements sociaux de leurs objectifs à long terme, ou
bien leur permettent-elles de faire progresser leur cause auprès de l’électorat ? En nous appuyant
sur une enquête qualitative de terrain menée en mars et avril 2008, nous montrons, à l’aide de la
théorie  des  cadres  interprétatifs  (framing  theory),  que  la  réponse  à  cette  question  est
principalement à chercher dans les formes de mobilisation mises en œuvre, plutôt que dans la
nature des questions soumises à référendum ou dans la conception des messages de campagne.
This  article  examines  the  coincidence  of  apparently  contradictory  ballot  measure  results  in
Colorado  in  2006  as  a  case study  of  the  significance  of  this  form  of  direct  democracy  for
progressive social movements: are ballot measures an opportunity or a hindrance for progressive
organizing? Based on qualitative fieldwork in Denver in March and April 2008, we use framing
theory to argue that whether ballot measure campaigns divert the action of social-movement
organizations from their long-term goals, or allow them to pursue them by empowering voters is
more dependent on the forms of organizing, than on issue-choice or messaging.
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